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THE FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
LIFE INSURANCE, ANNUITIES AND
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS
AFTER THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
THEODORE PAUL MANNO*
An author examining the income taxation of life insurance
products, including annuities and individual retirement accounts
(IRAs), realizes that, to even the most learned general practitioner,
the language of the Internal Revenue Code sometimes appears to
have been co-authored by James Joyce and Casey Stengel. Further
difficulties are encountered with such complex insurance concepts
as "split dollar,"1 "net amount at risk,"2 and "the fifth dividend
option,"3 often rendering expert tax counsel wary of advising cli-
ents on the consequences of proposed insurance strategies.
This area has been further complicated by the trilogy of tax
legislation which ended on October 22, 1986, the signing of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. 4 A new order of taxation evolved from the Tax
* Member of the New York Bar; Director of Advanced Planning Services, Mutual Ben-
efit Life Insurance Company, Newark, New Jersey; J.D., Fordhan University; M.A., LL.M.
in Taxation, New York University. The views expressed herein are solely those of the au-
thor, who wishes to thank Brian W. Frikert, Esq., Barbara Hege, C.P.A., and Michael J.
Chazan, Esq., for their comments during the preparation of the manuscript.
' See infra note 38 and accompanying text (definition of split dollar policy).
2 See S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE 7 (10th ed. 1982). The "net amount at
risk" is basically the amount the insurer would pay on a given date were death to occur,
minus the amount, if any, that the policyholder would have received on that date as the
cash surrender value had the policyholder surrendered the policy while living. Id.
I See generally id. at 398. Dividends on policies represent a return to the policyholder
of premium amounts which were not actually needed to pay for the coverage. This is caused
by the fact that actuarial computations are done on conservative estimates of mortality and
investment return. Rather than actually receiving the dividend in cash, policyholders can
elect a number of automatic uses for it. A "fifth" option to become popular was the use of
the dividend to purchase an amount of term insurance equal to the cash value, and then, if
any amount remained, to reduce premiums on the underlying coverage. See, e.g., J. PEDOE,
LIFE INSURANCE, ANNUITIES, & PENSIONS 174 (2d ed. 1970). By purchasing one-year term
insurance each year exactly equal to the cash value, the net amount for which the insurer is
"at-risk" remains the same every year.
4 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) [hereinafter Act]. The Act signifies its com-
prehensiveness by changing the name of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA)s and the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA),6 the final contours of
which the Tax Reform Act has attempted to mold. The aim of this
article will be to serve as a guide to this evolution for general prac-
titioners without sacrificing the detail and analysis necessary to
make this treatment a valuable source for attorneys who specialize
in this area.
LIFE INSURANCE
In discussing the tax implications in the area of life insurance,
of main concern is the treatment accorded transactions involving
the cash value account of a policy. This is not an issue when deal-
ing with term life insurance inasmuch as the policyholder has no
right to receive any amount under the policy if he decides to termi-
nate the coverage during the particular period or term.7 "Ordinary
life"' and the more recently developed "universal life" 9 contracts,
however, have a cash value.10 Surrender of these policies by the
policyholder during his lifetime results in the payment by the in-
surer to the policyholder of this cash value. If no surrender is
made, the cash value continues to grow within the policy resulting
in "inside build-up." As long as the policy conforms to the defini-
tion of life insurance in section 7702 of the Internal Revenue
Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) [hereinafter "TEFRA"].
e Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984) [hereinafter "DEFRA"]. The 1984 amend-
ments to the Internal Revenue Code were embodied in a separate division of DEFRA enti-
tled the Tax Reform Act of 1984. In order to avoid confusion with the 1986 Act, "DEFRA"
will be employed herein as the sole designation for the 1984 legislation.
7 See J. APPLEMAN, 1 INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3 (1981) (term insurance defined).
8 Ordinary life insurance has been defined as "[w]hole life insurance usually issued in
amounts of $1000 or more, with premiums payable annually, semi-annually, quarterly, or
monthly." Whole life insurance is, in turn, defined as "[c]overage until death for payment of
a specified payment of a specified premium." 2 ERNST & WHINNEY, FEDERAL INcoMlE TAXA-
TION OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES G-20 and G-28 (1984).
9 See Skillman, The Impact of TEFRA and the 1984 Act on the "Inside Build-Up
Under" Life Insurance Products, 43 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 40.02[4] (1985), which
states:
The death benefit under universal life consists of a cash fund plus a layer of term
insurance, both of which are explicitly identified to the policyholder. The cost of
the term portion of the death benefit is borne by periodic charges against the cash
value. The policyholder is generally free to make premium payments in any
amount at any time.
Id. at 40-4. See generally Shaw, Universal Life Insurance: How it Works, 71 A.B.A. J. 68
(1985) (contrasts universal life to whole life and discusses pre-1986 taxation of universal life
policies).
1o See S. HEUBNER AND K BLACK, supra note 2, at 71.
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Code," this "inside build-up" is not included in gross income for
federal tax purposes.
The cash value account can also be utilized by the policy-
holder without surrendering the contract in its entirety. One
method is by borrowing from the insurer a portion of that ac-
count. 2 There is no personal liability to repay in such an insurance
policy loan; the debt cannot be collected by the insurer from any
asset of the debtor other than the policy itself. These policy loans
generically have the status of "nonrecourse" debts, which, as such,
are a legitimate form of indebtedness. 3 Thus, there arises the issue
of whether the interest paid on policy loans is deductible under
federal law.
POLICY LOAN INTEREST DEDUCTIONS
In the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 264 was the piv-
otal statutory provision relating to the deductibility of interest
paid on insurance policy loans. Before the passage of the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, the principles enunciated in that section of the
code were applied without regard to the taxpayer's status as an
individual or an employer, or to the dollar amount of the loan. Sec-
tion 264 did make a distinction, even before 1986, with respect to
the mode of premium payment. Section 264(a)(2) states that no
interest is deductible with respect to a single premium policy, de-
fined as one in which "substantially all" the premiums are due
within the first four years of the policy.' 4 As to policies which are
not single premium policies, section 264(a)(3) states that interest is
" See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (discussion of section 7702 definition).
12 See Mosemy Garrison, Siskin Memorial Found. v. United States, 790 F.2d 480, 482
(6th Cir. 1986) (holding that withdrawals against cash value of life insurance create indebt-
edness). See also Minnis v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1049, 1054 (1979) (policy loans generally
regarded as form of indebtedness); Salley v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 896, 903 (1971) (obliga-
tion of borrower to pay interest on life insurance loan sufficient to support tax deduction),
aff'd, 464 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1972). The confusion that exists over the distinction between
policy loans and policy withdrawals is exemplified by the fact that the Siskin case refers to
the amounts taken from the contract as being "withdrawals" when even a cursory reading of
the decision clearly indicates they are loans.
13 See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983) (nonrecourse debt is legitimate
debt because if property encumbered by such is sold, amount of debt is required to be
included in amount realized on the sale). See generally Miller, The Supreme Court Does It
Again in Tufts: Right Answer, Wrong Reason, 11 J. REAL EsT. TAX'N 3 (1983) (strength and
weaknesses of Tufts decision).
" I.R.C. § 264(b) (1982). The Tax Court has held in the single premium context, that
73% is not "substantially all." Dudderar v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 632, 633 (1965).
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not deductible if borrowing is contemplated, a subjective standard
depending upon the policyholder's state of mind or intent. Guid-
ance as to that intent is provided by section 264(c)(1), which states
that for purposes of the 264(a)(3) "contemplation rule," the tax-
payer is conclusively presumed not to have the forbidden intent if
one of four circumstances is met. 15 The one test most often cited
and relied on by counsel as a safe harbor is the "four-out-of-seven"
rule of section 264(c)(1). This objective mathematical test states
that if the taxpayer does not utilize borrowing to pay any four of
the first seven annual premiums due on the policy,"6 the taxpayer
is not deemed to have contemplated borrowing for purposes of the
section 264(a)(3) prohibition. Thus, prior to the Tax Reform Act of
1986, as long as the "four-out-of-seven" rule was satisfied, the full
amount of the policy loan interest was generally deductible, both
for individuals and corporations.
The first major change in this area under the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1986 is the distinction now drawn between individual
and business taxpayers. Individuals are now effectively barred
from deducting policy loan interest, even if they comply with the
"four-out-of-seven rule," unless one of the four exceptions to the
"personal interest rules" is satisfied by the use of the proceeds. 7
However, a business taxpayer's or employer's ability to deduct this
interest is now subject to a dollar limitation. 8
For noncorporate taxpayers, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 de-
nies all "investment interest" deductions in excess of the tax-
payer's investment income, and eliminates all "personal interest"
,5 See I.R.C. § 264(c) (1982). One of these circumstances is when the interest is de
minimis, that is, less than $100. Id. at § 264(c)(2). Others, including borrowing because of an
"unforeseen substantial loss of income or unforeseen substantial increase in . . . financial
obligations," id. at § 264 (c)(3), or borrowing "in connection with [a] trade or business," id.
at § 264 (c)(4), seem to be very narrowly interpreted by the relevant Treasury regulations.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.264-4 (1964). While these two exceptions may be of use in a defense
posture, their inherent dependence upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the
Treasury's apparent intent to circumscribe them, argue strongly against relying on them in
a planning situation. It must also be noted that the trade or business exception is subject to
the $50,000 limit recently imposed on employer's ability to deduct interest on policy loans.
See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
16 Treas. Reg. § 1.264-4(d)(1) (1964). A new seven year period, requiring a new "four-
out-of-seven" compliance, begins whenever there is a "substantial increase" in the premium
due under the contract. The Service will not issue rulings on what the word "substantial"
means in this context. See Rev. Proc. 85-22, 1985-1 C.B. 551.
" See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
's See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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deductions.' 9 "Personal interest" includes interest on policy loans
other than: (1) policy loans incurred or continued to purchase or
carry property held for investment;2 0 (2) interest which is taken
into account in calculating income or loss from a "passive" activity,
that is, a tax shelter;21 (3) loans taken to pay interest on estate
taxes deferred under section 6166;32 and (4) interest incurred in
carrying on a trade or business.23
Moreover, the effective date of the provision disallowing de-
ductibility of interest is exceedingly strict. Interest paid in 1987 or
later is subject to this rule of nondeductibility, regardless of the
year in which the policy was purchased or the year in which the
loan was made.24 There is, however, a "phase-in" provision appli-
cable to personal interest.25
" I.R.C. § 163(h) (West Supp. 1987) (amending § 163(d)). Prior to the issuance of the
final text of the bill, "consumer interest" had been used as the operative term in lieu of
"personal interest." See H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1986). The Act also
clarifies that the deductions allowable for the noncorporate alternative minimum tax will
not include personal interest. See I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1987).
20 I.R.C. §§ 163(d)(3)(A) & (h)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1987) (as amended).
21 Id. at § 163 (h)(2)(E) (as amended). Interest with respect to passive activity is sub-
ject to the new provisions concerning limitations on loss deductions from such activities. See
id. at § 469.
22 Id. at § 163(h)(2)(E)(as amended). The new code at section 163(h)(2)(D) also excepts
from the definition of personal interest "any qualified residence interest" within the mean-
ing of section 163(h)(3). Since "qualified residence interest" is defined in subparagraphs
3(A) and 5(A) of IRC § 163(h) as interest which is paid or accrued during the taxable year
on indebtedness which is secured by the principle residence of the taxpayer or one other
residence, and since insurance policy loans are only secured by the policy itself, the section
163(h)(2)(D) exception is irrelevant to policy loans. A separate provision affects interest
paid by a taxpayer on federal estate taxes under section 6166 of the Code. Any portion of
the federal estate tax which is attributable to the ownership of certain closely held business
interests can be paid over a ten year period, after a four year deferral, if the closely held
interests constitute at least 35% of the adjusted gross estate. Id. at § 6166. An important
element of the statutory scheme is the cross-reference in section 6166(f) to section 6601. The
latter section provides that during the "interest-only" period, the interest payable on all
amounts up to $153,000 of the deferred liability shall be paid at a 4% rate. See id. at §
6601(j). It is significant to note that while the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 provides that
the prohibition against the deduction of personal interest generally applies to interest paid
on federal tax underpayments, it does not apply with respect to payments under section
6166. See id. at § 163(h)(2)(E).
2- Id. at § 163(h)(2)(A). However, this last exception is also affected by a separate pro-
vision of the Tax Reform Act which limits the deduction which an employer can take with
respect to loans on policies on the lives of employees and persons financially interested in
the business. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
2 See id. at § 163(h).
25 See id. at § 163(h)(6) and (d)(6)(B). For the taxable year which begins in 1987, the
taxpayer may deduct 65% of the interest which is nondeductible solely because of these
provisions; in 1988, 40% of such amounts are eligible for deductibility; in 1989, 20% is de-
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
It should also be noted that the new tax act contains no spe-
cific provision allowing the nondeductible policy loan interest to be
added to the basis for purposes of determining the potential gain
the policyholder must include in gross income or surrender of the
policy, or on receipt of withdrawals or other sums from the pol-
icy.28 Consistent with this principle, amounts received during the
insured's lifetime from an insurance or annuity contract cannot be
included in gross income for tax purposes unless, at the very mini-
mum, the cash value (including amounts previously withdrawn) ex-
ceeds the aggregate premiums or other consideration paid for the
policy. 27 Clearly, counsel can, and should, argue that nondeductible
interest payments are encompassed within the statutory definition
of "other consideration paid" for the policy under section 72(e)(6)
and should therefore be included in the basis. 28 However, the lack
of a specific provision to that effect in the final text of the 1986
Act, when contrasted to the specific allowance of such an addition
to the basis in an earlier tax reform proposal," would make the
ultimate success of this argument questionable.
The imposition of these severe restrictions on policy loan in-
terest deductions for individuals, together with the general decline
in individual tax rates, will make minimum deposit plans less de-
sirable. "Minimum deposit" is a broad term which is used here to
connote any method of premium payment which involves extensive
borrowing against the policy cash value to pay future premiums,
and the utilization of the tax savings generated by those interest
payment deductions so that the life insurance coverage will pre-
ductible; and in 1990, the permissible percentage is 10%. In 1991, the phase-in ends. These
percentages are the same as those applicable to "limitations on losses and credits from pas-
sive activities," an anti-tax-shelter provision. See id. at § 469.
2 Under the Internal Revenue Code, gain equals the amount realized less the tax-
payer's adjusted basis in the property. I.R.C. § 1001 (1982). As a general rule, "basis" equals
the cost of the property. Id. at § 1012.
17 Id. at § 72. In addition, as will be discussed, until the advent of TEFRA in 1982,
amounts withdrawn from annuities were also not included in gross income until they ex-
ceeded basis; amounts received from life insurance contracts are included in gross income
only when they exceed basis, unless certain mathematical relationships between the cash
value and the death benefit are violated during the first fifteen policy years. See infra notes
89-94 and accompanying text.
28 But see Chapin v. McGowan, 271 F.2d 856, 858 (2d Cir. 1959) (interest on funds
borrowed to pay insurance premiums are not includible as consideration paid for policy).
29 See STAFF OF JT. COMM. ON TAX'N, 99th CONG., 2D SESs., TAx REFORM OPTIONS, Title
X(A)(1)(b) at 42 (1986). This proposal stated that "interest on policyholder loans would be
treated as a nondeductible premium payment." Under section 72(e), all premium payments
are included in basis. See supra note 27 and acompanying text.
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sumably be purchased with a minimum of "out-of-pocket" cost.3 0
The potential attractiveness of many minimum deposit plans
rested upon an interrelated chain of assumptions. One of the as-
sumptions was the continuation of a 50% or close to 50% tax
bracket so that a deductible interest expense produced a tax bene-
fit roughly equal to half the expense, and another was the contin-
ued deductibility of policy loan interest for individuals.31 Neither
one of these two assumptions remains viable under the 1986 Act. 2
The future nondeductibility of policy loan interest also ad-
versely affects taxpayers who use the cash method of accounting
and were thus unable to deduct policy loan interest even under
pre-1986 law because they did not actually pay it out-of-pocket.3 3
As in certain minimum deposit plans, these cash-basis taxpayers
would add the amount of the interest to the amount of the loan
which was already encumbering the policy value. 4 The case most
often cited for this premise is Battelstein v. Commissioner.a
'0 See generally Beck, Perspectives on Minimum Deposit, 1984 J. Am. Soc'Y. C.L.U. 34
(discusses minimum deposit plans and risks involved); Beck, Perspectives on Minimum De-
posit Revisited, 1984 J. Am. Soc'Y. C.L.U. 46 (court decisions and developments affecting
such plans).
31 See Beck, Perspectives on Minimum Deposit, supra note 30, at 34-37.
32 See I.R.C. §§ 1 and 11 (West Supp. 1987). Under the new tax law, individual income
tax rates will range from 11% to 38.5% in 1987. In 1988, the maximum tax rate will nomi-
nally be 28%, but because taxpayers will suffer a "phase-out" of personal exemptions and
the benefits of the 15% rate at a particular point, depending on marital and filing status, an
effective rate of up to 33% will apply to certain income.
11 Compare Trees. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (1967) with Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1967).
Taxpayers who use the cash method of accounting can only deduct an otherwise allowable
expense in the taxable year in which the expense is actually paid; in contrast, accrual basis
taxpayers can deduct when all events necessary to fix liability have occurred, and the
amount thereof can be reasonably ascertained.
", See, e.g., Keith v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1944) (where taxpayer owed
interest on life insurance policy loan obtained additional loans and applied to payment of
such interest, amount of interest not deductible); Prime v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 487
(1939) (interest of life insurance policy loan added to principal when due and remained
unpaid by holder held not deductible); Thomason v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 576 (1935)
(giving of new note does not entitle one to deduction for interest paid since no actual pay-
ment); Rev. Rul. 73-482, 1973-2 C.B. 44 (cash basis taxpayer only entitled to deduction for
interest actually paid).
3- 631 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Wilkerson v. Commissioner, 655 F.2d 980 (9th
Cir. 1981). Although these cases did not specifically mention insurance policy loans, the
conclusion that they were relevant to minimum deposits was not difficult to reach. This
relevance became even more pronounced when the Internal Revenue Service in 1983 "re-
minded" cash basis taxpayers that interest deductions would not be allowed when the tax-
payer paid the interest expense with "funds obtained from a creditor through a second loan,
an advance, or any financial arrangement similar to a loan." I.R.S. News Release IR-83-93
(July 6, 1983). Again, the Service's language would seem to apply the prohibition to plans of
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
Before the 1986 Tax Act, otherwise deductible amounts which
were disallowed because of the "Battelstein doctrine" eventually
became deductible in the taxable year in which the interest was
subtracted from the cash amount owed to the policyholder upon
the surrender or exchange of the policy, to the beneficiary at the
insured's death, or when the policy lapsed by reason of nonpay-
ment of premiums .3  However, if these events were now to occur
after 1986, the deemed "payment" of the interest caused by these
events would be subject to the personal interest nondeductibility
rules discussed herein.3 7 Policyholders in this situation who have
not paid their accumulated interest by an unrelated cash payment
before January 1, 1987 will wish to do so before the end of the
phase-out period in 1991, to preserve the deduction of at least part
of the actual payment, and to avoid having the later "deemed"
apayment disallowed.
Another area in which these changes will have some impact is
the taxation of "split-dollar" insurance policies. Split-dollar is es-
sentially a contractual arrangement in which an employer can pay
all or part of the premium for the policy pursuant to an agreement
with the insured-employee under which "the employer is entitled
to receive, out of the proceeds of the policy, an amount equal to
the cash surrender value, or at least a sufficient part thereof to
equal the funds it has provided for premium payments."38
minimum deposit in which the policy holder borrows from the cash value to pay interest on
loans previously taken from the cash value.
" See, e.g., Estate of Hooks v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 502 (1954) (interest on policy
loans which insurer bound to deduct from settlement of policies on death of insured held
paid and deductible by surviving spouse); Cheeseman v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH)
1334 (1969) (cash basis treatment); Rev. Rul. 73-482, 1973-2 C.B. 44 (distinguishes cash
basis taxpayer's nonability to deduct under certain circumstances).
17 See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
11 Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11. See generally Fizer, Split Dollar Life Insurance,
TRUSTS & ESTATES 11 (July 1982) (income, estate and gift tax consequences of split dollar
plans); Singer, Second Generation Split Dollar Plans, C.L.U. J. 50 (July 1983) (variations on
traditional split dollar plans). With respect to life insurance which is not provided to se-
lected employees but rather to employees as a group, the new law subjects group-term life
insurance to the new "Nondiscrimination Rules for Certain Statutory Benefits," and makes
certain technical corrections to the DEFRA provisions affecting such coverage. See Act,
supra note 4, at §§ 1151, 1827 and 1851.
The employer's contractual right under the split dollar agreement to recoup its premi-
ums paid can be reflected in a collateral assignment of the policy with the insured-employee
as policyholder. Alternatively, the employer can be the policyholder, with the employee's
rights reflected in an endorsement on the policy. See Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11. The
employee is free to name anyone he chooses as beneficiary of the remaining portion of the
death benefit. See id.
1986]
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The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has specifically ruled
that an employer's right to recover the amount to which it is enti-
tled does not constitute an interest-free loan." Thus, the changes
enacted by DEFRA with respect to such loans, and the personal
interest limitations in the 1986 Tax Reform Act, do not impact on
the taxation of the economic benefit which is conferred upon the
employee in current and future split-dollar plans, as long as the
plans are in effect.
In the context of interest-free loans made after June 6, 1984,
DEFRA essentially stated that if an obligation to repay money is
entered into in an employer-employee setting, and is payable upon
demand, the interest which was not charged ("foregone interest")
is treated for tax purposes each year as if it had been paid to the
lender by the borrower, and then returned to the borrower by the
lender.40 Therefore, in a "corporation to shareholder" situation, the
interest amount which is deemed to have been returned to the em-
ployee-borrower each year is characterized as a dividend, taxable
to the borrower and not deductible by the lender; in an "employer
to employee situation" it is compensation, taxable to the borrower
and presumably deductible by the lender.41 The other fictional
transfer, that is, the original "payment" of interest to the lender, is
interest income to the lender. It is also deductible to the borrower
unless disallowed by some other provision such as section 265
which prohibits interest deductions on borrowing to invest in tax-
" Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11 (discusses split dollar plan in general and as interest
free loan citing legislative history which makes it necessary to determine loan issue), rev'g
Rev. Rul. 55-713, 1955-2 C.B. 23. See Scharf & Manno, Using Split Dollar Insurance to
Benefit Valued Employees, 1 Successful Est. Plan. Ideas and Methods (P.H.) 2001-02 (Aug.
19, 1985) (discussion of Rev. Rul. 64-328 and split dollar insurance in general).
40 See I.R.C. § 7872 (a)(1)(A), (B) (West Supp. 1987) (added by DEFRA, supra note 6,
at § 172). The provision applies of course not only to loans on which no interest is paid but
also to all loans on which less than a market rate of interest is charged. A "demand loan" is
defined in I.R.C. § 7872(f)(5) (West Supp. 1987).
41 I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(B), (C) (West Supp. 1987). The calculation of the dollar amount
of the interest which is deemed paid and received though this legal fiction is done on an
annual basis. See id. at § 7872(b)(2). When a loan is made to an employee and is payable at
the end of a specified term, the lender is deemed to be transferring to the employee an
amount equal to the sum transferred less the discounted value of the borrower's promise to
repay the sum at the end of the term. See id. at § 7872(b)(1). This inclusion of a substantial
sum in the gross income of the employee would normally make the use of a term loan inad-
visable even without the prohibitions against interest deductions for the deemed payments
of foregone interest thereafter. For a discussion of below-market rate loans in the non-busi-
ness context see generally Wilbanks, Interest-Free Loans are No Longer Tax-Free: Tax
Consequences of Gift Loans, 47 MONT. L. REv. 39 (1986).
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exempt securities; the four-out-of-seven rule 42 discussed above or,
the personal interest rules. 43
If interest-free loan treatment were proper for split dollar
plans, the "imputed interest" each year on the loan would be inter-
est income to the employer, and compensation income to the em-
ployee. The employer would presumably receive an offsetting de-
duction, because its "payment" of the compensation would be an
ordinary and necessary business expense.44 If the employee were a
shareholder, the IRS could disallow the deduction by claiming that
the "payment" was a dividend.45 In any case, the employee would
not enjoy an offsetting deduction for interest paid. s This pattern
of taxation, however, does not apply to a split dollar plan because,
as stated above, the IRS has rejected "loan treatment" for these
plans. The proposed regulations concerning interest-free loans con-
firm that they are not intended to cover such an arrangement.47
The 1984 and 1986 tax legislation may nonetheless have an
unfavorable impact when parties terminate the split-dollar agree-
ment if they do so without reimbursing the employer at that point
in time for the amount due under the agreement. One customary
method of terminating a split-dollar arrangement has been a can-
cellation of the contractual agreement to pay premiums, accompa-
42 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
" See I.R.C. § 163(h) (West Supp. 1987); supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text
(personal interest rules discussed).
"1 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1982).
45 I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(e) (West Supp. 1987). Although the legislative history could be
read as treating the fictional payment as a dividend whenever a shareholder is involved, see,
e.g., JT. COMM. ON TAX'N REPORT TO THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 697 [hereinafter DEFRA:JCT], it
is suggested that the normal criterion of deductibility applies if the arrangement is entered
into in order to compensate the individual reasonably for personal services actually per-
formed as an employee, i.e., it is deductible even if he is also a shareholder. I.R.C. § 162
(1982). If, however, the facts and circumstances show that the arrangement uses corporate
assets to benefit the individual in a manner or amount in which a non-shareholder in the
same position would not be so benefitted, then it is a nondeductible dividend.
4' The employee's interest expense would not be deductible for two reasons. First, he
would be using the borrowed funds to pay all the premiums thus violating the "four out of
seven rule." See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Second, the deemed interest ex-
pense, as of 1987, would be subject to the personal interest prohibition unless one of the
exceptions were satisfied. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
4 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-2, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,553 (1985). The word "loan" is to
be interpreted broadly to include any transfer of money from one person to another and the
use of the money by that person. Id. This pattern is not reflected in split dollar because
there the money is transferred to a third party (the insurer) whose contract creates a bundle
of rights, some of which flow to the employer and others to the employee.
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nied by the execution of a collateral assignment securing the em-
ployer's right to recover the premium amounts previously paid.
The assignment, and any promissory note evidencing this debt,
were typically noninterest-bearing. This arrangement does appear
to constitute an interest-free loan, and the parties are estopped
from invoking the protection afforded to split-dollar agreements by
the IRS because the parties have terminated the agreement."8 As a
result, the employee would have gross income each year for the
imputed interest income, but would not be able to offset a deduc-
tion for the interest "paid" unless an exception to the personal in-
terest rule was found.
Regarding business taxpayers, the 1986 Act, for the first time,
places a dollar limit on the deductibility of loans encumbering a
policy on the life of any officer or employee of the employer, or on
the life of any person financially interested in the taxpayer's trade
or business. 49 The taxpayer will now be allowed a deduction of the
interest on loans taken against a policy on an individual's life only
to the extent such loans do not exceed $50,000.50 The fact that pol-
icy loan proceeds are used in a trade or business "does not affect
the deductibility of interest paid on the loan. 51
The new Act applies this $50,000 ceiling to policies purchased
after June 20, 1986.52 In contrast to the personal interest limitation
for individuals, which references the date the interest is paid, poli-
cies purchased before June 21, 1986 would not be subject to this
"' See Scharf & Manno, supra note 39, at 2004-05 (methods and effect of terminating
split dollar agreements).
" Act, supra note 4, at § 1003 (adding new I.R.C. § 264(a)(4)). Section 264(a)(4)
provides:
Any interest paid or accrued on any indebtedness with respect to 1 or more
life insurance policies owned by the taxpayer covering the life of any individual
who (A) is an officer or employee of, or (B) is any person financially interested in,
any trade or business carried on by the taxpayer to the extent that the aggregate
amount of such indebtedness . . . exceeds $50,000.
Id. The new Act incorporates the "Dole Amendment," which was affixed to the bill origi-
nally passed by the Senate. See 132 CONG. REc. H. 58051 (daily ed. June 20, 1986) (state-
ment of Senator Dole).
11 If corporations are members of an affiliated group, only a single $50,000 limit is avail-
able to the group as a whole. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 341.
11 See id. The interaction of the dollar limit with the "trade or business" exception of
section 264(c)(4) of the code and section 163(h) is specifically addressed by the Conference
Committee Report: "[I]f a sole proprietor borrows under a life insurance policy on the sole
proprietor's life, the interest paid on the loan (to the extent the loan exceeds $50,000) is not
deductible even though the proceeds of the loan are used in the sole proprietor's trade or
business." Id.
52 Act, supra note 4, at § 1003(c).
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dollar limitation regardless of the taxable year in which the debt
was incurred or the year in which the interest was paid. A colloquy
on the floor of the Senate clearly reflects the further intent of some
legislators to exempt from the meaning of the word "purchase" the
exercise of "business exchange riders" whereby one insured is sub-
stituted for another under a policy owned by a business.53 To illus-
trate, if a policy were purchased by a corporation in 1985 on the
life of a general manager, and that manager was to terminate em-
ployment in 1987, the substitution of a newly-hired general man-
ager as the new insured pursuant to the business exchange rider
would not subject loans on that policy to the $50,000 limitation.
Concern has been expressed over the effect of this colloquy since
"this issue was never discussed, and therefore never agreed to by
the conferees. '54 Where the change of the insured occurs under a
policy which retains the same policy number and issue date, it
would appear that this concern is unfounded because there is no
new policy and thus, no purchase after the effective date.
It was further stated by the floor managers that a change in
ownership after the effective date would not trigger the $50,000
limitation.5 5 Therefore, it appears that a policy purchased by an
individual on or before June 20, 1986, and transferred to his or her
employer even after that date could avoid both the "personal in-
terest" prong and the "$50,000 corporate limit prong" of the 1986
Act. This would seem to be the case, even without relying on the
Senate colloquy, when the insured individual owns at least 80% of
the stock of the corporation employing the insured. Even if a broad
reading were given to the word "purchase," a transfer to a corpora-
" See 132 CONG. REc. S13957 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1986) (colloquy among Senators Dole,
Packwood, and Long).
132 CONG. REc. E3389-91 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986) (statement of Chairman Rostenkow-
ski on Senate Floor Colloquy regarding H.R. 3838, The Tax Reform Act of 1986). Appar-
ently, exchanges of policies after June 20, 1986 for a policy issued by the same insurer have
been exempted from the term "purchase." This is a rather strange distinction since it is
clear that policy exchanges are eligible for tax-free treatment under section 1035 irrespective
of whether they are intramural or not. See Rev. Rul. 72-358, 1972-2 C.B. 473. See also Rev.
Rul. 68-235, 1968-1 C.B. 360 (holding no gain or loss recognized on exchange of life insur-
ance contract provided all § 1035(a) requirements met). In addition, the TEFRA grandfa-
ther rule for annuities is not forfeited by a tax-free exchange regardless of whether the new
policy is from the same or a different insurer. See infra note 108. Equally interesting is the
fact that the colloquies do not require that section 1035 be satisfied as a condition of pre-
serving the grandfathering. The author understands that it is therefore the opinion of some
practitioners that an exchange will suffice even if it does not qualify under section 1035 for
tax-free treatment.
15 See 132 CONG. REC. S13957 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1986).
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tion of which the transferor controls 80% or more is a tax-free
transaction under section 351,56 and gives the corporation a substi-
tuted basis under section 362, not a cost basis under section 1012. 7
Since there is no cost basis, it would be very difficult for the IRS to
argue on technical grounds that the corporation "purchased" the
policy. Thus, even if the statute is interpreted to apply to any
purchase and not merely the original purchase from the insurer,
the immunity is preserved.
To understand the context in which the amendment was sub-
mitted, a distinction must be made between the "insured" on a life
insurance policy, and the "policyholder." The insured is the person
whose life is the subject of the coverage. His death is the triggering
event to the payment of the death benefit. The insured may also
be the owner of the policy but need not be. The owner, who is
called the policyholder, controls the policy. The owner: (1) names
the person or entity who will receive the death benefit at the in-
sured's death; (2) decides the manner in which dividends paid
under the policy during the insured's lifetime should be applied;
(3) decides whether to borrow against the cash value; and (4) de-
cides if and when to surrender the coverage.5 8
One common example in which a policyholder and the insured
are separate entities exists when a corporation purchases insurance
on the life of a key employee because it anticipates disruption and
lost profits for a reasonable time after the employee's death. 9
Other common reasons for corporate-owned insurance are a corpo-
ration's desire to use the death benefit, the cash value, or the loan
proceeds to redeem a shareholder's stock, or to pay an employee or
a shareholder amounts that the corporation has contracted to pay
under a binding deferred compensation agreement. Similar reasons
can be found in the context of a partnership. The possibility of
56 See Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1 (as amended in 1967) (no gain or loss recognized on trans-
fer of property to corporation solely in exchange for stock or securities of such corporation if
immediately after exchange, such person owns at least 80% of voting power and shares
outstanding).
'7 See I.R.C. § 362(a)(1) (1982) (cross reference to section 351 transaction).
11 See 2 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 771 (1966); R. KEETON, BASIC
TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 411(a) (1971).
"' See generally 19B J. APPLEMAN, supra note 58, §§ 11136-39 (1982). The terms "key
employee" and "key person" (formerly "key man") coverage should properly be applied only
to business insurance motivated by the fear of lost profits and increased costs resulting from
the death of an officer or employee. Id. Unfortunately, the terms are used loosely in common
parlance to connote any corporate-owned policy, regardless of the intended use of the
proceeds.
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borrowing against the cash values of such firm or corporate-owned
policies on a tax-favored basis has now been impaired by the
"$50,000 limit" of the 1986 Act.60 Furthermore, since many busi-
nesses are corporations, the combined effect of this limit and the
reduction of the maximum corporate tax rate to 34%61 will be to
greatly reduce the attractiveness of the corporate minimum de-
posit arrangement in a manner similar to the situation for
individuals.6 2
Application of different rules for individuals and employers
raise the additional issue of the proper treatment to be accorded to
indebtedness occurring with respect to the cash value of a policy
which is subject to a split dollar agreement. As mentioned previ-
ously, such an arrangement can be effected in two ways: the em-
ployer may be the owner, or the individual may be the owner.
While there is no statutory authority for the proposition, it is sub-
mitted that the deductibility of a loan against the cash value
should be evaluated not on the basis of the identity of the techni-
cal owner of the policy, but rather on whose portion of the death
benefit is subject to the loan. 3 Thus, if the employer has the right
to recoup the entire cash value, any loan would be an encumbrance
against the employer's share, and interest paid on that loan should
therefore come within the "$50,000 rule". Conversely, assume the
employer is to recoup only the premiums it paid, the cash value
'o The dollar limit of section 264(a)(4) can be applied as follows: Assume Aragon Cor-
poration has five employees. The corporation owns three ordinary policies on Mr. Boleyn,
two policies on Ms. Seymour, one policy on Mr. Cleves, and no policies on Ms. Howard and
Mr. Parr. Assume further that there is a $50,000 loan on the first policy on Mr. Boleyn's life,
and $15,000 has been borrowed on each of the two other policies: there is a $40,000 loan on
one policy on Ms. Seymour's life, and $20,000 on the other; there is no loan on the policy on
Mr. Cleves' life. Assume also that the interest rate is 8%, that is, that there is $4,000 paya-
ble in interest on a $50,000 loan. The corporation would pay $6,400 in interest on the poli-
cies on Mr. Boleyn's life, but only $4,000 is attributable to $50,000 of loans so the deduction
for the other $2,400 is disallowed. Likewise as to the coverage on Ms. Seymour, the interest
on $60,000 would be $4,800, so $800 would be disallowed. There are no loans on Mr. Cleves's
coverage, so there is no deduction. It is significant that even though the total amount of
loans in this hypothetical ($80,000 plus $60,000, $140,000) equals less than $50,000 times the
number of covered employees ($150,000), there is no authority in the Act allowing a "carry-
over" or credit from one employee's coverage to another.
1, Act, supra note 4, at § 601 (amending I.R.C. § 11). The amended version of section
11 is effective for taxable years beginning on or after July 1, 1987. Certain segments will be
taxed at 39% in a manner similar to the phase-out applicable to individual taxpayers. Cf.
Act, supra note 4, at § 101(a).
12 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
63 But cf. Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961) (assignee and not assignor of
insurance policy can deduct interest on policy loans assuming assignee pays the interest).
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exceeds that amount at a particular point in time, and the con-
tracting parties arrange for the loan to be charged only against the
employee's portion of the cash value. It is logical to assume that
the "personal interest rules" would apply, since the loan is being
made in substance by the individual, regardless of which method
of policy ownership is used. There still remains the issue of
whether or not interest deductions are allowed at all on universal
life contracts, regardless of the taxpayer's status. There can be no
doubt that the rule that interest deductions for single premium
policy loans are banned remains intact. Nevertheless, neither the
statute, nor the legislative history, states how a universal life policy
is to be classified except "that universal life is not always treated
as a single premium policy.
64
While the discussion heretofore discussed interest paid by the
61 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-341, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 341.
The Ways and Means Committee Report to the original House Tax Reform Bill pur-
ported to restate the rule that interest deductions are never allowed for single premium
policies. The Report specifically states that the intent of its "clarification" is to render nuga-
tory the claims of "some practitioners" who had apparently asserted that the exceptions in
section 264(c) could be utilized to override the rule against interest deductions for single
premium policies. HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT TO H.R. 3838, H.R. REP. No. 426,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 660-61, reprinted in STANDARD FED'L TAX REPORTS No. 53 (CCH Spe-
cial 7 1985)[hereinafter H. RPT.]. Section 264(c) specifically states that "for purposes of sub-
section (a)(3) above," the four exceptions permitting deductibility shall apply. Id. Subsec-
tion (a)(3) applies only to "other than single premium policies," while (a)(2) specifically
governs single premium contracts. Hence, since any assertion to the contrary would be stat-
utorily flawed, there should be no disagreement with the congressional conclusion that the
exceptions do not apply to single premium policies. Accordingly, deductions on policies on
which substantially all of the premiums are paid within the first four years of the contract
are clearly disallowed.
More importantly for our purposes, the House Report also stated that one of the rea-
sons for its "clarification" was that "it has come to the Committee's attention that some
practitioners may characterize a universal life insurance policy as a contract that provides
for annual premiums due for purposes of the four out of seven rule." H. RPT. at 660-61. The
clarification, however, never stated whether or not interest deductions for universal life are
permitted under the "four-out-of-seven rule." Nor did the report state whether the policy is
deemed to be subject to the nondeductibility rule for single premium contracts. Because the
issue of whether universal life is a single premium policy is such a pivotal issue, it was
assumed that the final Act or Committee Report would address it meaningfully. Unfortu-
nately, the Joint Committee on Taxation's summary of the Conference Committee agree-
ment stated only that the Senate accepted the House Committee Report language on this.
See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-340, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 340. Finally, the Conference Committee Report to the final text of the Act
stated: "Generally, section 264(a)(2) also applies to contracts other than those where the
nonpayment of premiums would cause the policy to lapse, but no inference is intended that
universal life policies are always treated as single premium contracts." Id.
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taxpayer to the insurer, there is also a change in the 1986 Act con-
cerning interest received from the insurer. Under section 101(a) of
the code, life insurance death benefit proceeds are generally ex-
cluded from gross income for federal tax purposes. This favorable
income tax-free treatment is retained under the 1986 Act. Under
previous law, however, when the proceeds were paid in install-
ments, a surviving spouse (but no other beneficiary) was also able
to exclude $1,000 of the interest element of the payment each
year. 5 The new Act abolishes this, and makes the interest element
totally taxable to all taxpayers.16
WITHDRAWALS FROM THE CASH VALUE
The cash value is not only a source of loans, it can also be a
source of non-debt withdrawals. Prior to August 13, 1982, non-re-
curring withdrawals from both annuity contracts and life insurance
policies were included in the policyholder's gross income only when
the aggregate amounts received under the contract exceeded the
premiums paid for that contract.6 7 Basically, the taxpayer was al-
lowed to recover basis fully before being taxed. As will be discussed
below, TEFRA changed this rule as to annuities, and also treated
annuity loans as if they were withdrawals.6 ' The 1982 Act, how-
ever, retained the cost recovery principle with respect to life insur-
ance, and continued to treat insurance policy loans as loans and
not as withdrawals."' A fair reading of TEFRA of 1984 after its
"' See I.R.C. § 101(d)(1) (1982) (repealed by Act, supra note 4, at § 1001(a)).
" Act, supra note 4, at § 1001(a) (amending I.R.C. § 101(d) (1982)). Section 1001(a)
applies to amounts received with respect to deaths occurring after Dec. 31, 1986, in taxable
years ending after that date. See SENATE FINANCE Comm. RPT. TRA 1986, supra note 54, at
488. The new statute also directs insurers to use sex-neutral life expectancy tables pre-
scribed by the Treasury in calculating the difference between the portion of each install-
ment attributable to the nontaxable benefit, and the portion which is taxable as the interest
element. Act, supra note 4, at § 1001(b) (amending I.R.C. § 101(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1982)).
'7 See I.R.C. § 72(e) (1972) (amendment by TEFRA, supra note 5, at § 265; infra note
104 and accompanying text (former cost recovery for annuity). "Aggregate amounts re-
ceived" included actual withdrawals and unrepaid policy loans which are extinguished on
surrender or transfer of the insurance policy, as well as dividends received in cash. Id. See
supra note 4 (discussion of policy dividends).
08 See TEFRA, supra note 5, at § 265 (amending I.R.C. § 72(e) (1976)); see also infra
notes 105-07 and accompanying text (LIFO treatment mandated by TEFRA with respect to
annuity loans and withdrawals).
69 TEFRA, supra note 5, at § 265 (amending I.R.C. §72(e) (1976). The statutory au-
thority for the preservation of cost recovery and of the testament of loans as true debt rests
on the distinction between a "subsection" of the Internal Revenue Code (which is part of a
section) and a "paragraph" (which is part of a subsection). Subsection 72(e) was amended
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passage, also reveals no change in the favorable method of treat-
ment for withdrawals.
If a contract does qualify as life insurance, the death benefit,
for the most part, is eligible for the section 101(a) exclusion from
income tax,70 and the growth of the inside build-up is tax-free.71
Until the passage of TEFRA, there was no quantitative definition
of life insurance in the Internal Revenue Code. In an extreme situ-
ation, the IRS could only attack a policy on the basis of case law
which required that the contract shift the risk of loss occasioned
by TEFRA to provide "last - in - first out" (LIFO) treatment for accounts received. Id.
However, paragraph 72(e)(5) of the subsection provides that the "old" rule (no taxation
until basis is recovered, and no recharacterization of loans as withdrawals) applies to any
contract covered by that paragraph, namely, contracts entered into before August 14, 1982.
I.R.C. § 72(e)(5) (1982). Section 72(e)(5)(A) states that "this paragraph," (the cost recovery
rule of paragraph 72(e)(5)), not the LIFO rule of subsection 72(e), applies to life insurance
contracts. I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)(A).
70 I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) (1982). Section 101(a)(1) provides that generally, proceeds received
as a death benefit under a life insurance contract shall not be includible in gross income. Id.
The exclusion of the death benefit from gross income for federal tax purposes is not invio-
late. If there has been a transfer of the policy for valuable consideration, the beneficiary can
only exclude from income that amount he or she paid for the policy, and only subsequent
premiums paid. I.R.C. § 101(a)(2). Obviously, a sale of a policy from one party to another
for cash is a transfer for value. But even if no cash changes hands, a transfer can be "for
value." For example, when a shareholder who owns a policy on his own life signs a buy-sell
agreement with another shareholder and transfers the policy to him in return for a recipro-
cal promise there is clearly legal "consideration" and hence, a transfer for value. See
Monroe v. Patterson, 197 F. Supp. 146 (N.D. Ala. 1961). There are two general exceptions to
the sanction imposed by this rule. First, a transfer for value will not impair the exclusion,
that is, the death benefit will be fully excluded from income if the transfer is to the insured
himself, to a partner of the insured, to a partnership of which the insured is a partner, or to
a corporation of which the insured is a shareholder or officer. I.R.C. § 102(a)(2)(B) (1982).
Second, a transfer will be fully protected if the transfer gives the person who receives the
policy a basis in the policy which is calculated in whole or in part with reference to the
previous owner's basis. I.R.C. § 101(a)(2)(A) (1982). See generally Brody & Leimberg, The
Not So Tender Trap - The Transfer for Value Rule, J. Am. Soc'v. OF C.L.U., May 1984, at
32 (discusses five "safe harbor" situations in which beneficiary can receive insurance pro-
ceeds income tax-free despite transfer of policy for value).
7'1 The proof of this negative from the plain meaning of the language has always been
awkward. Before the advent of section 7702, a common explanation was that section 72
spoke only in terms of amounts "received" and the inside build-up was not actually or con-
structively "received" because the taxpayer could not reduce it to possession without a
"substantial limitation or restriction," namely the non-continuation of the insurance cover-
age. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a)(as amended 1979). See also I.R.C. § 72 (1982). With re-
spect to insurance policies, one can now also point to section 7702(g)(1)(A) which provides
that if the contract does not meet the definition of life insurance under subsection (a), the
"income on the contract for any taxable year of the policyholder shall be treated as ordinary
income received or accrued by the policyholder during such year." I.R.C. § 7702(g)(1)(A)
(1984). The converse of this section, therefore, is that if the contract does meet the section
7702(a) definition, the income on the contract is not treated as income in that year.
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by the insured's death to the insurer and away from the insured's
beneficiary and that there be a distribution of this loss among all
the insureds covered.7 2 No mathematical "bright line" existed as to
how much risk was to be shifted. Such an abusive extreme situa-
tion is illustrated by a policy on a healthy thirty-five year old
which has a cash value of $99,000 and a death benefit of $100,000.
This leaves the insurer in a position in which the insured receives
$100,000 if he dies and $99,000 if he lives. Since the insurer is in-
vesting the $99,000 and earning a return on it, to speak of a mor-
tality "risk" in such a situation is an absurdity.
TEFRA added section 101(f) to the code which provides that
the income tax exclusion normally granted to life insurance pro-
ceeds by section 101(a) would be forfeited by a contract which
both: (1) allowed flexible premium contributions rather than re-
quiring a set premium amount each year; and (2) had a death ben-
efit which fell below a certain percentage of the cash value.7 3 In
1984, section 7702 entitled "Life Insurance Contract Defined, '7 4
was added to the Code to further discourage contracts which were
denominated as "life-insurance policies," but which had a cash
value so disproportionately great in contrast to the full death bene-
fit that the investment nature of the contract impermissibly out-
weighed the risk element that the insurer was undertaking.
DEFRA modified the 1982 "stop-gap" definition by: (1) requiring
mathematical compliance by all policies issued after 1984 and not
just those having flexible premiums;7 5 (2) changing the sanction to
the loss of tax free treatment for the inside build-up rather than
the loss of tax-free treatment for the death benefit;7 and (3) for-
72 See Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941). See also Commissioner v. Trega-
nowan, 183 F.2d 288, 290 (2d Cir. 1950); Tighe v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 557, 564 (1959)
(both cases finding insurance arrangement involves shifting and distributing risk).
7"See TEFRA, supra note 5, at § 266(a) (adding I.R.C. § 101(f)). As long as the insured
was age 40 or lower, the policy would qualify as life insurance if the death benefit equaled
140% or more of the cash value. For ages after 40, the 140% was allowed to decline by one
percent for each year until age 75 whereupon it "froze" at 105%. See I.R.C. §101(f)(3)(C)
(1982). See also Rinaldi-Sandler, Gallagher & Sherry, Coping with TEFRA in the Market-
place, 1983 C.L.U. JOURNAL, Jan. 1983, at 14, 15-16 (discusses TEFRA rule that demands
that flexible premium contracts meet one of two tests to be eligible for exclusion).
7" DEFRA, supra note 6, at § 221 (adding I.R.C. § 7702).
7' See DEFRA, supra note 6, § 221(b)(2). While the old definition for flexible contracts
only applies to contracts issued between 1982 and 1984, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 con-
tains a technical correction to DEFRA clarifying that any policy issued in 1984 which meets
the current section 7702 requirements will be treated as meeting the old section 101(f) re-
quirements. Act § 1825(d) (modifying DEFRA § 221(b) by adding new paragraph 221(b)(3)).
76 See DEFRA, supra note 6, at § 221(a) (adding I.R.C. § 7702(g)).
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mulating an elaborate definition under which a policy would qual-
ify if it complied with either of two tests. 7
Both of the tests stated in section 7702 involve actuarial con-
cepts and computations, and it is not the purpose of this article to
define them in detail.78 One test, called the "guideline premium
plus cash value corridor test," is somewhat similar to the "old" test
of section 101(f) in that part of it requires the death benefit to be
at least a certain percentage of the cash value. The severity of con-
gressional concern, however, is shown by the increment in that per-
centage: the death benefit ratio has been raised from 140% to at
least 250% of the cash value until age 40.71 In addition, the premi-
ums paid on the policy cannot exceed the actuarial amount defined
in the statute.80 The second test, the "cash value accumulation
test," requires the death benefit at all times to equal or exceed the
amount which the cash value would purchase as a "net single pre-
mium" for a person of that age.81 The "net single premium" for
any given dollar amount of insurance is the single amount which a
person of that age would have to pay at this time to receive that
given amount of coverage for the rest of his life based on the guar-
anteed factors in the policy. If the contract does not comply with
either test, the policyholder must include, in gross income, an
amount equal to the sum of the increase in the net cash surrender
value of the contract during the year and the cost of the protection
element less the amount of premiums paid. 2 The permissibility of
subtracting dividends paid to the policyholder was eliminated by a
technical correction in the 1986 Act. 3
One provision which was subject to misinterpretation was Sec-
tion 7702(f)(7)(B) which stated that, "[iun the case of any change
which reduces the future benefits under the contract, such change
shall be treated as an exchange of the contract for another con-
tract." This provision was construed by the Senate Committee Re-
" DEFRA, supra note 6, at § 221(d)(3).
78 See generally Hahn & Adney, The New Tax Definition of Life Insurance Contract,
1984 J. Am. Soc'Y. C.L.U. 40 (1984) (present and historical treatment of defining life insur-
ance); Skillman, supra note 9, at § 40.03 (1985) (common law definition of life insurance).
79 See I.R.C. § 7702(d)(2) (West Supp. 1985) (table of minimum required percentages
by which death benefit must exceed cash value showing gradual decline each year of one's
life).
80 I.R.C. § 7702(a)(2), (B) (West Supp. 1985).
8 I.R.C. § 7702(a)(1), (b) (1984).
82 I.R.C. § 7702(g)(1)(B) (1984).
83 Act, supra note 4, at § 1825(c) (amending I.R.C. § 7702(g)(1)(B)(ii)).
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port as having the effect of reversing the cost recovery rule of sec-
tion 72 thus imposing on life insurance withdrawals the same LIFO
treatment which the 1982 Act had imposed on annuities.84 This in-
terpretation was questionable for three reasons. First, it seemed in-
conceivable that Congress would have countenanced such a major
change without clearly stating that or at least cross-referencing
section 7702(f) to section 72.85 Second, the statutory language
clearly indicated that the "exchange" which was deemed to occur
when a withdrawal was made occurs only for the purposes of test-
ing the policy against the definitions provided in section 7702, not
for purposes of characterizing the substantive section 72 taxation
of the amount withdrawn.86 Third, even if it were conceded that an
exchange had been deemed to occur for all purposes, it is far from
clear that the substantive law relating to exchanges of insurance
policies would result in taxation whenever a withdrawal of cash ac-
companies the exchange. 7 A compromise provision intended to
84 See S. REP. No., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. Explanation of Deficit Reduction Tax Bill of
1984, 578-79 (Comm. 1984) (hereinafter DEFRA: SFC Explanation).
85 Cf. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Law and Controlling Reports, 1984 ST. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) No. 31, at 980 (July 18, 1984) (clear language of the TEFRA Committee Reports
concerning LIFO treatment for annuities).
11 See I.R.C. § 7702(f) (Supp. 1985) (specifically stating that rules in said subsection
apply only "for purposes of this section").
87 If a life insurance policy is exchanged for another, the transaction is a like-kind ex-
change eligible for section 1035 income tax-free treatment. I.R.C. § 1035(a)(1) (1982). If the
policy is exchanged for a new policy plus a cash withdrawal, the transaction also falls within
section 1031(b) which states that the lesser of the amount of the cash, or the amount of the
"gain, if any" must be included in gross income. See id. at § 1031(b). Therefore, since sec-
tion 7702(f)(7), before its amendment by the 1986 Act, purported to treat a withdrawal
which reduces future benefits as an exchange, section 1031(b) would apply. See id. I.R.C. §
7702(0(7). One possible interpretation of section 1031(b) relies on the fact that section
72(e), as stated above, only includes withdrawals in gross income when in the aggregate they
exceed basis. Hence, there is no "gain, if any" until the aggregate amounts received, includ-
ing those deemed received as parts of deemed exchanges, exceed the aggregate premiums.
See Manno & Nolan, Internal Revenue Code Section 1035 and the Other Side of Exchange
Programs, J. Am. Soc'Y. OF C.L.U., Nov. 1985, at 66-67.
It appears, however, that the authors of the Senate Committee Report and the Joint
Committee on Taxation Report did not agree with (or were unaware of) the above interpre-
tation of the "gain, if any" language of section 1031(b). See DEFRA: JCT, supra note 45, at
654; DEFRA: SFC Explanations, supra note 84, at 578.
Specifically, those reports reflected the view of other commentators that section 72 is
irrelevant to the calculation of "gain, if any" for insurance policies under section 1031(b).
See Dropick, Life Insurance Exchanges Under Section 1035, 17 CONN. L. R.v. 525, 538
(1985); Stoeber, Is There a "Greene" Light for Policy Exchanges Without an Exchange?
C.L.U. KEEPING CURRENT SYLLABUS, Mar. 1986, at 29, 32. These commentators indicate that
if $10,000 in premiums had been paid, and the cash value had grown to $15,000, there would
be $5,000 of gain and the withdrawal of $3,000 would cause gross income to be recognized
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remedy this problem was appended to the 1986 Act. 8 This provi-
sion limits LIFO treatment to "abusive" situations involving in-
vestment-oriented contracts. As a result, the reversal of the cost
recovery rule applies only to withdrawals from contracts in the
first fifteen policy years where the cash value before the with-
drawal is "too high" as compared to the death benefit after the
withdrawal, and where the withdrawal causes a reduction in the
death benefit or other benefits under the policy.' A formula was
subsequently designed to penalize a "high cash value and low
death benefit" policy.90
If a policy complies with the section 7702 definition of life in-
fully even though it did not exceed the basis. See Dropick, supra, at 538; Stoeber, supra, at
32. It is to be noted that since the "adjustments provision," as amended, no longer posits an
exchange paradigm, and does in fact cross-reference section 72, it would appear at least
possible that it too might now be factored into the calculation of "gain, if any" for section
1031(b) purposes. Hence, for example, if a section 1035 exchange is made in policy year six
when the insured is 40 years of age and cash is liberated, either actually or through the
extinguishment of a policy loan, section 72 cost-recovery would apply unless the new death
benefit is less than 250 percent of the cash value of the old policy unreduced by any policy
loan. Nonetheless, there remains the question of whether the "new death benefit" would be
the death benefit of the new policy, or the death benefit, the old policy would have had after
the deemed withdrawal had the exchange not been made. If, however, the view that section
1031(b) pre-empts section 72 is correct, then the adjustments provision is irrelevant since
LIFO treatment would be imposed in any case. (The above comments originally constituted
part of the author's presentation to the 1986 Tulane Tax Institute, on the subject of "Tax
Problems in Exchanging Insurance and Annuity Policies.")
88 Act, supra note 4, at § 1825(b) (amending I.R.C. § 7702(f)(7)). Because of the less
than solid ground upon which the government's initial position rested, representatives of the
insurance industry had previously sought and received specific language in the Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation Report to the 1984 Act confirming that "this adjustment provision was
not intended to repeal indirectly the application of section 72(e) to life insurance contracts."
DEFRA: JCT, supra note 45, at 654. The Treasury, however, had continued to press for a
broad interpretation of this provision and a compromise was achieved on this issue in 1985
which was then appended to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the above-mentioned technical
corrections section.
89 See I.R.C. § 7702(f)(7) (West Supp. 1987). See generally Commito, "Adjustments"
Provision of I.R.C. 7702, J. Am. Soc'y. C.L.U. Nov. 1986, at 36 (in-depth examination of
7702(f)(7) after 1984 and 1986 Acts); Fitzgerald, Will Annuity Withdrawal Rules Be Ap-
plied to Life Insurance?, 125 TRUSTS & EST. 35 (1986)(options for executives deferring com-
pensation while earning tax-free growth). Section 1825 of the new Act also includes certain
technical corrections to the computations under I.R.C. section 7702. The 1984 legislation
spoke in terms of a change in "future benefits or any qualified additional benefit." DEFRA,
supra note 6, at § 221(a) (adding I.R.C. § 7702(f)(7)) (1982). The quoted terms are defined
in I.R.C. § 7702(f)(4), (f)(5)(a). Since the 1986 legislation speaks more generally in terms of
a change in "benefits," it is suggested that the new adjustment provision would encompass
not only an alteration in "future benefits or any qualified additional benefit," but also in
any "other additional benefits" as that term is defined in I.R.C. § 7702(f)(5)(c).
11 See I.R.C. § 7702(f)(7)(B), (D) (West Supp. 1987).
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surance by virtue of the cash value accumulation test, one ascer-
tains whether LIFO treatment will apply by doing the following
calculation during the first five policy years. First, the amount of
the death benefit which will be payable under the policy after the
withdrawal is made must be determined. A calculation must then
be made of the amount of cash value which would produce that
death benefit if the cash value was used to purchase coverage on a
net single premium basis. If the second step produces an amount
less than the actual cash value before the withdrawal, LIFO treat-
ment is imposed upon the amount of the difference.91 For policies
which qualify as life insurance under the "guideline premium and
cash value corridor" test, the amount subject to LIFO treatment
for the first five years will be measured by the greater of (1) the
amount by which the premiums paid exceed the guideline single
premium limitation before the withdrawal less the guideline single
premium for the amount of the reduction in the death benefit
caused by the withdrawal, or (2) the amount by which the cash
value before the withdrawal exceeds the post-withdrawal death
benefit divided by the cash value corridor percentage described
above. 92
During policy years six through fifteen, the taxable amount for
all policies is calculated in the following manner regardless of the
definitional test with which they comply. First, determine the
amount of the new death benefit which will be payable under the
policy after the withdrawal is made. This figure is then divided by
\the cash value corridor percentage applicable to the insured's age
under section 7702(d).9 3 If the result is an amount less than the
actual cash value before withdrawal, income is recognized in the
amount of the difference. For withdrawals made after the fif-
teenth policy year, the traditional cost recovery rule will continue
to apply. There will be taxation only if the withdrawal, when
added to all other amounts previously received from the contract,
exceeds the premiums paid for the policy.9 5 This "adjustment pro-
" See id. at § 7702(a)(1), (f)(7)(B), (f)(7)(C)(i) (West Supp. 1987). The taxable amount
will not, in any of the calculations, exceed the amount of the withdrawal, nor will it exceed
the "inherent gain" in the policy; that is, the cash value (less amounts already received)
minus the premium paid. Id. at § 7702(f)(7)(B), (C)(i).
92 See id. at § 7702(a)(1), (f)(7)(B), (C)(ii). The cash value corridor percentage is found
in (d)(2). See also S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 989 (1986).
-- I.R.C. § 7702(f)(7)(D) (West Supp. 1987).
94 Id.
"I See id. at § 72(e); supra note 68 and accompanying text (cost recovery rule).
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vision" raises a question regarding split-dollar arrangements. If the
agreement is terminated before the sixteenth policy year by with-
drawing an amount from the cash value sufficient to satisfy the
employer's claim, then section 7702(f)(7) would presumably apply
to the employer. It is possible to argue that it should not be im-
posed when the agreement was on the collateral assignment
method because the employer is then in the position of an assignee
exercising a mere security right and not of a policyholder making a
withdrawal. It appears, however, that section 7702(f)(7) is triggered
by a change in the policy itself and does not focus on the identity
of the proper person to be taxed; thus the IRS could define the
employer as having a mere recoupment right, and could then argue
that the employee should be taxed because he is the policy owner.
The fact that the withdrawn funds are used by the policyholder to
satisfy a pre-existing obligation does not alter the substantive tax-
ation of the withdrawal.
AMOUNTS RECEIVED FROM NONQUALIFIED ANNUITIES
A "nonqualified" annuity is essentially an annuity which a
taxpayer buys on the taxpayer's own initiative with "after-tax"
dollars. More specifically, the term refers to an annuity which does
not include part of a retirement plan, such as an individual retire-
ment annuity (IRA) qualified under section 408; a tax-sheltered
annuity qualified under section 403(b) for the employees of tax ex-
empt employers or state or local governments; an annuity owned
by a pension or profit sharing plan qualified under section 401(a);
or an annuity qualified under section 403(a) and issued in connec-
tion with such a plan.98
There are two methods by which money can be received from
an annuity contract. The first method, to "annuitize" the contract,
is one where payments are made at regular intervals to the annui-
tant over a period of time, traditionally the lifetime of the annui-
tant, or of the annuitant and his or her spouse.9 7 The date on
" See I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)(D) (West Supp. 1987) (defines contracts under qualified plans).
Unfortunately, the word "annuitant" is sometimes used interchangeably in the every-
day speech of the insurance industry to mean the person by whose life span the payments
are measured. This person may not be the same person to whom the payments are made.
This imprecision is exacerbated by the Treasury Regulations to section 1035 which provide
that in a tax-free exchange of annuities, the "obligee" on the old and new contract must be
the same. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1035-1 (1960). Suppose A owns an annuity on B's life. A
designates C to receive the annuity payments during B's life, then designates D to receive
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which these payments begin is termed the "annuity starting
date"9 and the period of time before that date is traditionally
called the "deferral period." Regularly recurring payments received
after the annuity starting date are considered partially a return of
basis and partially income.
To illustrate how these payments are to be taxed, let us as-
sume that a taxpayer has paid $20,000 for a deferred "straight-life"
annuity"' which he has chosen to annuitize when his life expec-
tancy is twenty years. The insurance company has ascertained that
it can make annual payments of $1,500. Under section 72 of the
code, the taxpayer takes the "investment in the contract" ($20,000)
and divides it by the "expected return" (20 x $1,500, or $30,000) to
produce an "annuity exclusion ratio" of two-thirds.100 Under pre-
1986 law, the taxpayer would then exclude two-thirds of each pay-
ment ($1,000) for as long as he might live, even if he were to live
for 30 years whereupon $30,000 would be the total amount ex-
cluded from income. If the taxpayer were to die after 10 years, only
$10,000 would be excluded.10 1 Consequently there was a gambling
element to the exclusion.
Under the 1986 Act the exclusion ratio remains the same.
However, once the dollar amount of the investment in the contract
is recovered, $20,000 in the example above, all further amounts re-
ceived are includible in gross income.10 2 Therefore, if the above-
described annuitant lived thirty years, the last ten payments would
be fully taxed. Conversely, if the annuitant died before recovering
his investment, he would receive a deduction for the difference on
his final income tax return.103 Therefore, in the example above, if
any death benefit due at B's death, and finally names W to succeed to A's ownership if A
dies. There are a number of obligees. The only person who is not an obligee would be B
since no sums or rights are ever owed to him: his is merely the life by whose length the
obligations are measured. It would be highly desirable for all involved with annuities to
agree to limit the use of the word "annuitant" to the person entitled to receive income
payment under the contract and to use the term "measuring life" to designate the person
whose life is the subject of the contract.
98 See I.R.C. § 72(c)(4) (1982).
99 A "straight-life" annuity is an annuity which does not have a refund or joint and
survivor payment feature in case of the then annuitant's death. See C. LowmDEs, R KRAMER
& J. MCCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES § 10.2, at 235-36 (3d ed. 1974).
100 I.R.C. § 72(b), (c)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1987) (definitions of "exclusion ratio," "invest-
ment in the contract" and "expected return").
1o1 I.R.C. § 72(b) (1954).
102 See I.R.C. § 72(b) (West Supp. 1987).
103 Id. at § 72(b)(2), (3).
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the taxpayer died after nine years the remaining $11,000 of his in-
vestment which was not recovered would be deductible on the final
return.
The second method of receiving amounts from an annuity con-
tract is the use of withdrawals. Prior to the 1982 Act, withdrawals
made in this fashion received the same cost recovery treatment as
insurance policies. An annuitant could purchase a policy for
$50,000 with a deferral date far in the future, allow its cash value
to grow to $100,000, then withdraw $50,000 tax free. Section 72
treated the $50,000 withdrawal on a "first-in, first-out" ("FIFO")
basis; namely, the annuitant was withdrawing his $50,000 initial
investment and not the $50,000 interest growth.104
The 1982 Act imposed "last-in, first-out" ("LIFO") treatment
on withdrawals from annuity contracts. Loans from such contracts
were to be treated as withdrawals and a 5% penalty on amounts
which were included in gross income was exacted.1 5 As a result,
the annuitant in the above example is now treated as if he received
the $50,000 interest, not the $50,000 original basis. Section 72
states that amounts received before the annuity starting date do
not enjoy the benefits of the annuity exclusion ratio, thus the full
$50,000 is included as gross income. In addition, it is potentially
subject to an additional 5% penalty tax."' 6 Initially, this penalty
tax did not apply if the contract had been held over ten years
before the withdrawal was made, if the taxpayer was over age fifty-
nine and a half or was disabled, or if the annuitant was deceased.
The penalty also did not apply if an amount received was one of a
series of substantially equal periodic payments received over the
annuitant's lifetime, or received over sixty months.10 7 A grandfa-
ther clause further ameliorated the harshness of the new rule.10 8
14 See I.R.C. § 72(e)(1)(B) (1954).
101 See TEFRA, supra note 5, at § 265 (amending I.R.C. § 72(e) (1954)). See generally
Chiechi & Adney, An Analysis of the Effects of the Life Insurance and Annuity Provisions
of TEFRA, 57 J. TAX'N 338 (1982) (analysis of TEFRA to universal life and deferred annui-
ties); Hira, TEFRA Restrictions on Annuities: A Way to Avoid Them, 62 TAXEs 10 (1984)
(examines use of universal life insurance in lieu of tax deferred annuity to sidestep TEFRA
restrictions on latter); Pehrson & Adney, Taxation of Annuity Contracts under TEFRA, 14
TAX ADVISOR 66 (1983) (analysis of TEFRA changes for companies issuing annuities).
"I See TEFRA, supra note 5, at § 265 (amending I.R.C. § 72(q) (1984)) (entitled "5
percent penalty for premature distributions from annuity contracts").
10I See I.R.C. § 72(q)(2) (1982).
108 Id. § 72(e)(5)(B). The grandfather rule was relatively straightforward. If a contract
was purchased before August 14, 1982, the old "recovery of basis" rule applied, even to
withdrawals made after that date. Id. To avoid undue complexity, the analysis in the text
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DEFRA eliminated the ten-year "safe harbor" for policies is-
sued after January 18, 1985.19 Amounts included in income which
were not part of a series of substantially equal payments over sixty
months or over the annuitant's (or annuitant's and spouse's) life
expectancy became subject to the 5% penalty regardless of how
long the policyholder owned the annuity unless the policyholder
was over age fifty-nine and a half or was disabled.11 Withdrawals
from annuities purchased in the "TEFRA to DEFRA" period were
taxed on the LIFO method and were subject to a 5% penalty tax
which could be avoided if the contract were in effect for ten years.
However, if such an annuity was then exchanged after January 18,
1985 for a new annuity, the ten year exemption was forfeited.""
Exchanges of contracts purchased before or after that corridor pe-
riod did not forfeit anything.
The 1986 Act has further restricted the free availability of
withdrawals by increasing the penalty to 10% of the amount in-
cluded in gross income"112 and by tightening the applicability of the
penalty tax by eliminating "the payment over sixty months" ex-
emption.113 The Act also imposes a retroactive penalty when (1)
assumes that all annuities are single premium contracts (annuities into which one and only
one payment can be made by the holder). The LIFO provision is actually applicable to
withdrawals allocable to "investment in the contract" after August 13, 1982. Id. Therefore,
if an annuity to which multiple contributions can be made consists of amounts paid by the
taxpayer before August 14, 1982, and other amounts paid on or after that date, withdrawals
are deemed to be first, a tax-free recovery of the pre-TEFRA contributions, second, a with-
drawal of the interest earnings on both sets of contributions, and finally, a tax-free recovery
of the post-TEFRA contributions. See Rev. Rul. 85-159, 1985-41 I.R.B. 5. In addition, even
after basis was recovered, no penalty was imposed. See I.R.C. § 72(q)(2)(F) (1982) (penalty
tax not applicable to distributions allocable to investment in contract before August 14,
1982). If a contract was issued after August 13, 1982 but could be traced back through any
number of tax-free exchanges to an annuity issued before August 13, 1982, that annuity was
also immune, since it succeeded to the status of the "pre-TEFRA annuity" for all purposes.
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2d SESs., GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF
THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FIscAL RESPONSIBILITY AcT OF 1982 365
(Comm. Print 1982).
103 See DEFRA, supra note 6, at § 222 (amending I.R.C. § 72(q)(1) (1954)).
110 See id. This age requirement and the elimination of the ten-year provision was
"consistent with a general objective of the Act to encourage the use of annuities as retire-
ment savings as opposed to short-term savings." DEFRA: JCT, supra note 45, at 658.
"I See DEFRA: JCT, supra note 45, at 660. In contrast, if a section 1035 nontaxable
exchange was effected at any time from an annuity which had been issued before August 14,
1982 or from an annuity which had been issued on or after that date pursuant to a tax-free
exchange for a pre-August 14, 1982 annuity, cost recovery treatment and complete immu-
nity from the 5% penalty would still be preserved. See id.
12 See I.R.C. § 72(q)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
M' See id. at § 72(q)(2)(D) (eliminating following language: "over a period extending
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distributions over the lifetime of the annuitant (or the annuitant
and spouse) begin before age fifty-nine and a half, and the mode of
payment is changed to a pattern which would not be permitted
before that age or, (2) distributions over the permissible sixty
month period began before the effective date of the 1986 abolition
of that option, and the annuitant accelerated the payment after
the effective date of the Act, even if that acceleration was to take
place when he was over age fifty-nine and a half.114 In either case,
the individual must pay an additional tax, in the year of the mode
change, equal to 10% of all of the distributions which have been
received from the contract, including those which were originally
permitted when they were received." 5
In the case of annuities owned by corporations or trusts, the
1986 Act has created an exception to the rule that the inside build-
up of both life insurance policies and annuities is free from income
taxation. The new statute provides that as to a non-qualified annu-
ity not owned by a human being (or by the estate of a deceased
human being), the growth in its cash value must be currently in-
cluded each year in the owner's gross income. 1 6 This provision is
aimed at corporate-owned annuities used to provide employers
with the cash necessary to satisfy their obligations under deferred
compensation agreements entered into with employees.1 7
Although this provision specifically applies only to annuities,
other provisions in the Tax Reform Act have a more subtle but
potentially important impact on life insurance owned by corpora-
tions." '8 This change affects the calculation of the alternative mini-
mum tax ("AMT"), 1"9 and requires that a corporation, in calculat-
for at least 60 months after the annuity starting date").
:14 See id. at § 72(q)(3).
" See id.
116 See Act, supra note 4, at § 1135 (redesignating I.R.C. § 72(u) as 72(v), and adding
new § 72(u) (West Supp. 1987)). Section 72(u) now states that for any annuity contract not
held by a natural person "the income on the contract.., shall be treated as ordinary income
received or accrued by the owner during such taxable year." I.R.C. § 72(u)(1)(B) (West
Supp. 1987). "Income on the contract" is defined as "the sum of the net surrender value of
the contract as of the close of the taxable year plus all distributions under the contract
received during the taxable year" less the sum of "net premiums under the contract" for
current and prior years and "amounts includible in gross income for prior taxable years with
respect to such contract." I.R.C. § 72(u)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
:1 See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 704 (1986).
1 8 See I.R.C. §§ 55-59 (West Supp. 1987) (imposing and calculating alternative mini-
mum tax).
119 See id. at § 55(a)(b). The AMT is a fail-safe device for revenuers. Its essential im-
port is that if the taxpayer has done an exceedingly good job of avoiding taxation, the law
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ing the AMT for taxable years 1987, 1988 and 1989, will have to
take into consideration any item of "book income" (income as an
accountant would state it) not otherwise included in the AMT cal-
culation.12 0 While these provisions do not specifically focus upon
life insurance, it is a fact that corporate accountants indicate as an
item of book income each year the excess of the cash value increase
that year over the premiums paid in that year. Moreover, these
accountants also include as an item of book income, in the year of
the insured's death, the amount of the death benefit from the con-
tract, to the extent that the benefit exceeds the amount already
included in book income on the corporate financial statement.
Therefore, for the three years noted, these amounts will have to be
included in calculating a corporation's alternative minimum tax. In
subsequent years, these amounts would be included in the same
calculation as items which are otherwise excluded, but which in-
crease earnings and profits.121
Aside from the above-mentioned provisions relating to
amounts distributed from annuities prior to death, the 1986 Act
provides "forced distribution" rules regarding post-death distribu-
tions.1 22 These rules were designed to prevent the use of annuities
to defer income through several generations. The relevant DEFRA
section provided that at the death of the owner of an annuity, a
distribution of the monies in the annuity must be made within five
years (if death occurs after the annuity starting date), or at least as
rapidly as they were already being paid (if death occurs before that
date). 23 The 1986 Act supplements DEFRA by providing that if
the owner is not an individual, the "primary annuitant", that is,
the measuring life, will be treated as the owner for purposes of de-
termining the time at which this "forced distribution" must oc-
cur.' 24 The 1986 Act also clarifies the fact that forced distribution
requires that taxpayer to re-compute his tax liability under a different method.
120 See id. at § 56(c)(1)(A).
121 See id. at § 56(c)(1)(B), (g)(1), (4)(B)(ii) (1986). The new section 56(g)(4)(B)(ii) spe-
cifically includes in gross income the build-up in life insurance contracts. Id.
122 See id. at § 72(s) ("Required distribution where holder dies before entire interest is
distributed").
'23 See DEFRA, supra note 6, at § 222(b) (redesignating LR.C. § 72(s) as § 72(t), and
adding new § 72(s) (West Supp. 1987)).
'24 See Act, supra note 4, at § 1826(b)(1) (adding I.R.C. § 72(S)(6),(7) (West Supp.
1987)). Section 1826(c) of the new Act also amends I.R.C. section 72(q) to clarify that the
penalty there provided does not apply when the withdrawal is due to the death of the
"holder" or "primary annuitant". I.R.C. § 72(g)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1987). Also granted im-
munity are distributions from annuities which are "qualified funding assets" used in struc-
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requirements need not be met by individual retirement annuities
and by contracts which are part of qualified plans. 125 In addition, it
confirms that the forced distribution rules apply at the death of
each co-holder when there are co-owners of an annuity. 126
A further consequence of the 1986 Act, as it relates to annui-
ties, is the treatment to be accorded to gifts of annuities. The gen-
eral rule that gifts of property have no income tax consequences
has been abrogated with respect to taxpayers making a gift of an
annuity. 127 Aside from the traditional gift tax, such taxpayers will
have to pay income taxes on the difference between the cash value
at the point of the transfer and the original amount paid for the
contract.
28
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS: DEDUCTIBILITY OF
CONTRIBUTIONS
The final text of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 sharply curtails
the class of persons who can utilize IRA deductions.12 In addition,
tured settlements of certain tort claims. Id. at § 72(q)(2)(E), (F). The substantive taxation
of structured settlements is addressed by section 1002 of the Act which amends section 130
of the Code.
,26 See I.R.C. § 72(s)(5) (West Supp. 1987). Annuities qualified under I.R.C. section
403(a) and (b) will also enjoy this immunity. Id.
126 See id. at § 72(s). The 1986 amendment to section 72(q)(2)(B) clarifies that the
section 72(q) penalty does not apply to a forced distribution under section 72(s).
,27 See id. at § 72(e)(4)(C).
128 See id. For example, assume a father pays $50,000 for an annuity he owns, and then
transfers ownership two years later to his son when the cash value is $58,000. The father
must include in his gross income $8,000. This rule will not apply when the annuity is trans-
ferred from a person to his or her spouse or to a trust for that spouse. See I.R.C. §
72(e)(4)(C)(ii) (1986) and § 1041 (transfer of property between spouses). The rule is applica-
ble to contracts issued after April 22, 1987 in taxable years ending after that date. See H.R.
3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1826(b)(4) (1986). It should be noted that the father also has a
taxable gift of $38,000, assuming an available $10,000 annual gift tax exclusion and gift-
splitting with his spouse. Any individual may give $10,000 in a calendar year to another
individual without any federal gift tax. I.R.C. § 2503 (1982). The spouse of the donor can,
however, agree to treat half of the amount of the gift as a transfer to that spouse. I.R.C. §
2513 (1982). This results in a combined $20,000 per year exclusion for a married couple even
if all the property is titled in the name of one spouse.
129 I.R.C. § 219 (West Supp. 1987). In contrast to the President Reagan's original pro-
posal, which would have expanded the contribution and deduction limits for individual re-
tirement accounts and annuitites ("IRA's"), the provision represents what could be called a
"Reagan counterrevolution." It was under the present administration that the old discrimi-
nation was abrograted by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 311,
95 Stat. 105 (1981) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 219) (hereinafter ERTA) which made IRA's, and
the accompanying deductions, available to workers whether or not they were active partici-
pants in a qualified plan. ERTA § 311; see supra note 125 and accompanying text (qualified
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a viable nondeductible IRA contribution for taxable years after
1986 was created. 130
In reference to taxpayers who are not active participants in a
qualified pension or profit sharing plan, an unmarried individual is
still allowed to deduct any contributions to individual retirement
accounts or annuities up to an amount of $2,000 or 100% of com-
pensation, whichever is less.' Married persons also not covered by
qualified plans would each be allowed this $2,000 deduction on
their joint federal income tax return, providing both individuals
have sufficient compensation. 132 If only one spouse had compensa-
tion in that year, the current spousal IRA deduction of $2,250 for
the two spouses remains the same.133
As to the taxpayers who actively participate in qualified plans,
an unmarried individual will still be allowed a $2,000 deduction if
his adjusted gross income ("AGI") is less than $25,000. T'M If said
individual's AGI is more than the $25,000 "applicable dollar
amount," a partial deduction will be allowed whereby the other-
wise deductible $2,000 amount would be reduced by one dollar for
every five dollars of the excess AGI.135 For married individuals fil-
plans enumerated). An individual is "an active participant" for purposes of these rules if
amounts are contributed on behalf of the individual or his or her spouse to a section 403(b)
tax-sheltered annuity, or if the individual or spouse is an active participant in (1) a qualified
pension, profit-sharing or stock bonus plan; (2) a section 403(a) qualified annuity plan; (3) a
-section 408(k) simplified employee pension; (4) certain plans established for employees of
governmental entities and agencies; or (5) a section 501(c)(18) plan. See I.R.C. § 219(g)(5)
(West Supp. 1987). There is a great deal of law of the issue of "active participation." See,
e.g., Hildebrand v. Commissioner, 683 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1982) (employee for two months in
company with plan held "active participant"); Foulkes v. Commissioner, 683 F.2d 1105 (7th
Cir. 1981) (IRA deduction permitted when obvious that taxpayer will receive no double tax
benefit after forfeiting participation in former employer's pension plan and subsequently
contributing to IRA); Johnson v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 153 (7th Cir. 1980) (IRA contribu-
tion made prior to employment with company having pension plan held nondeductible since
now active participant). The passage of ERTA rendered this body of learning irrelevant for
taxable years 1982-86, but it will now, once again, become of great importance.
o See infra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 219(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
132 See id. at § 219(c).
133 See id. at § 1103, amending I.R.C. § 219(c)(1)(B). The Act removes an inequity of
prior law. If one spouse earns a substantial income but the other earns less than $250, the
aggregate amount deductible by both spouses is now maintained at $2,250. Under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954, the maximum deduction would have been $2000 plus 100% of
the compensation earned by the latter spouse. See I.R.C. § 219(c)(2)(B) (1954).
... See I.R.C. § 219(g)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1987).
I' See id. at § 219(g)(1)(2) (1986). For example, if the AGI were $30,000, the allowable
deduction would be $1000. However, the new code also provides for "rounding" down the
reduction to the next lower ten dollar multiple, see id. at § 219(g)(2)(C), and, if AGI exceeds
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ing a joint return, if either spouse is covered by a qualified plan
and both have compensation,. a $2,000 deduction is allowed to each
of them on their joint return if their combined AGI is less than
$40,000.136 Between $40,000 and $50,000, the deduction would be
reduced ratably with the deduction disappearing for couples with
$50,000 or more in combined AGI.137 If only one spouse has com-
pensation, the $2,250 combined "spousal" deduction for the couple
would be allowed only in years in which their combined AGI is
within the $40,000 applicable dollar amount. 13  If the combined
AGI is between $40,000 and $50,000, the deduction would be re-
duced ratably as above.139 The applicable dollar amount fully pro-
tecting the IRA deduction of a married individual who files a sepa-
rate return shall be zero.140 Therefore, the very first dollar of
adjusted gross income triggers a reduction in the $2,000 deduction
amount. 4 '
In addition to these deductions, the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 allowed employees to make deductible "qualified vol-
untary employee contributions" to qualified pension or profit-shar-
ing plans. These were deductible under section 219 and reduced
dollar-for-dollar the contribution and deduction otherwise allowa-
ble under section 219 for individual retirement accounts and annu-
ities. 142  The 1986 Act repeals the rules permitting these
deductions. 143
Prior to the 1986 Act, nondeductible contributions to an indi-
vidual retirement account or annuity were not allowed. If a tax-
$35,000, no deduction is available. A de minimis rule provides, however, that if this mathe-
matical computation results in an amount less than $200 but more than zero dollars, the
deduction stays at $200. See id. at § 219(g)(2)(B) (1986).
... See id. at § 219(g)(3)(B)(ii).
"3 See id. at § 219(g)(1)(2). The rounding down and de minimis rules also apply. See
supra note 135.
18 I.R.C. § 219(c)(2), (g)(1), (2)(A), (3)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
See supra notes 135, 137 and accompanying text.
140 I.R.C. § 219(g)(3)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 1987).
M41 See id. at § 219(g)(2)(A). For example, $4000 of the AGI will reduce the deduction
to $1,200, and $6,000 of AGI will reduce it to $800. Id. Of great importance to a married
person filing a separate return is the fact that if that taxpayer is not an active participant in
a qualified plan, these rules do not apply and the person gets a full deduction even if that
individual's spouse is an active participant in a qualified plan. See id. at § 219(g)(1)(4). This
is in direct contrast to the rule that if a joint return is filed, either spouse's participation in
a qualified plan puts both spouses in the "covered" category. See supra note 136 and ac-
companying text.
142 See ERTA, supra note 129, at § 311.
M Act, supra note 4, at § 1101(b)(1) (amending I.R.C. § 219(e) (West Supp. 1987)).
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payer made a contribution that exceeded the allowable deduction,
that amount constituted an "excess contribution" under section
4973(b) of the Code. These excess contributions were subject to a
6% penalty tax each year that they remained in the IRA thus as-
suring that generally, taxpayers made the contributions only when
a deduction was available.1 44 This rule remains in effect under the
new Code albeit with an exception allowing nondeductible contri-
butions for persons who are partially or wholly denied deductions
under the above rules for taxable years after 1986.145 Any contribu-
tions in excess of the total deductible and nondeductible contribu-
tions for a taxable year will continue to be subject to the excess
contributions tax. 48 The amount of nondeductible contributions
which will be allowed to a taxpayer is $2,000 (or 100% of compen-
sation if less) less any deduction allowed under the new statutory
scheme. 147 For a married couple, this amount is $2,250 (or 100% of
compensation if less) less any deductible amount when only one
spouse has compensation for that year.148
Nondeductible contributions must be so designated by the
taxpayer and must be reported on his tax return.1 49 If this is not
done, there will be a rebuttable presumption that all distributions
from all IRA's are attributable to deductible contributions and
hence are fully includible in the recipient's gross income.150 This
new availability of nondeductible contributions necessarily abro-
gates the former rule that the tax basis of an IRA is always zero. 51
Distributions will now have to take into consideration the fact that
after-tax dollars may have been contributed by the recipient, thus
creating an "investment in the contract" in the amount of these
non-deductible contributions. The new Code prescribes that
amounts received from an IRA will henceforth be included in, or
excluded from, gross income in accordance with the annuity exclu-
,44 I.R.C. § 4973(a) (1982).
"l Act, supra note 4, at § 1102 (redesignating LR.C. § 408(o) as 4081 and inserting a
new § 408(o) (West Supp. 1987)); Act, supra note 4, at § 1102(b)(1) (amending I.R.C. §
4973(b) (1986)).
146 See I.R.C. § 4973(b) (West Supp. 1987), as amended by Act, supra note 4, at §
1102(b)(1).
47 See I.R.C. § 408(o)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1987).
48 See id.
141 Id. at § 408(o)(1), (2), (4).
150 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 379 (1986).
,1' See I.R.C. § 408(d)(1) (1954).
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sion ratio described above. 152 This exclusion ratio, however, is not
to be calculated separately for each account or annuity, but rather
in the aggregate for all IRA's held by the taxpayer. 153
It can be expected that the new restrictions on the deductibil-
ity of IRA contributions will cause corporate counsel to consider a
section 401(k) "cash or deferred" plan as a means of doing indi-
rectly what cannot be done directly. Granted, the 1986 Code
reduces the maximum possible deduction under section 401(k) to
$7,000,15 thus having a negative impact on these profit-sharing
plans. Nevertheless, counsel should be aware that if a corporation
has a qualified plan but does not currently have a section 401(k)
plan at all, it may be able to provide its employees with the close
equivalent of a deductible IRA by instituting a section 401(k) qual-
ified plan allowing at least $2,000 in contributions. Under a section
401(k) plan, contributions made by the employer on behalf of the
employee are excluded from the employee's gross income.155
ROLLOVER CONTRIBUTIONS AND IRA DISTRIBUTIONS
Other than deductible and nondeductible contributions, the
only amounts that can be placed into an IRA are certain distribu-
tions from other IRA's and other types of retirement plans. 156 Es-
sentially, the Code provides that certain amounts received as dis-
tributions from these plans are excluded from gross income if the
I52 See Act, supra note 4, at § 1102(c) (amending I.R.C. § 408(d)(1)(2) (1982)). See also
supra note 100 and accompanying text (definition of exclusion ratio).
"I See I.R.C. § 408(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1987) ("all individual retirement plans shall
be treated as one contract"). For example, Warren Peace has contributed $2000 in each of
the years 1982 through 1986 to a Maspeth Insurance Company annuity contract qualifying
as an IRA and has properly deducted those amounts. For years 1987 through 1991, he con-
tributes $2000 each year in nondeductible amounts to a Middle Village Insurance Company
annuity also qualifying as an IRA. He is over age 591/2 in 1992 and starts to take distribu-
tions only from the Middle Village Company annuity. At that point, using an 8% growth
assumption, there is $11,733 in that account and $17,239 in the Maspeth contract. If Mr.
Peace takes a distribution of $1000 his exclusion ratio is .345, that is, the $10,000 invest-
ment in the contract for all IRA's divided by the $28,972 aggregate value of all the IRA
contracts and not .852 (the $10,000 investment in the contract from which the withdrawal is
made, divided by the $11,733 basis in that contract alone).
14 Act, supra note 4, at § 1105 (amending I.R.C. § 402(g)(1)(3)(A) (1982)).
I'l See I.R.C. § 402(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987) (taxation of employer contributions de-
ferred until benefits are distributed). See also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
380-81 (1986) (employee not required to include in income employer contributions even if
he could have elected to receive same amount in cash).
' See I.R.C. §§ 402(a)(5)(E)(iv); 403(b)(8); 408(d)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
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individual elects to "rollover" the sums. 15 7 These amounts are des-
ignated rollover contributions.
With respect to qualified plan distributions, a "qualified total
distribution" is allowed to be rolled over into an IRA, another
qualified plan, or a 403(a) annuity.158 Such a distribution is defined
as a distribution of 100% of the individual's account made either
because of the termination of the original qualified plan (in the
case of a stock bonus or profit-sharing plan, a complete discontinu-
ance of plan contributions) or when one of the four events listed in
section 402(e)(4)(A) has occurred (death, disability, age of fifty-
nine and a half or above or separation from an employer's ser-
vice). 59 This is to be contrasted with the treatment accorded to
"partial distributions" from qualified plans. Only those partial dis-
tributions in the amount of at least 50% of the balance of the indi-
vidual's account credited to the employee, and not made as part of
a series of periodic payments, are allowed to be rolled over, and
then only into an IRA 160
A linguistic anomaly became apparent in the 1954 Code,
namely, what treatment was to be accorded to a distribution of
100% of the individual's account made in the absence of those
events which would make it a "qualified total distribution". This
form of distribution arguably qualified under the 1954 Code as a
partial distribution since it was indeed a distribution of "any por-
tion" that was not a "qualified total distribution.' 16' Having satis-
fied the two criteria for a partial distribution, that is, more than
50% and a lump sum for a partial distribution, the Service con-
cluded that this was indeed a partial distribution eligible for an
IRA rollover. 6 2 This conclusion received congressional approval
when section 1852 of the 1986 Act changed the pertinent phrase to
"all or any portion.' 6 3
"' See supra note 156.
118 I.R.C. § 402(a)(5)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1987) (transfer distribution to an "eligible re-
tirement plan" defined in (a)(5)(E)(iv)).
" See id. at § 402(a)(5)(E)(i).
160 See id. at § 402(a)(5)(D)(i)(ii).
162 See I.R.C. § 402(a)(5)(E)(v) (1954).
1"2 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-21-107 (Feb. 28, 1986). It must be noted, however, that unless
the Secretary of the Treasury otherwise establishes the same principles by regulation, a
private letter ruling has no official precendential status. I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3) (1986).
"I Act, supra note 4, at § 1852(b)(1) (amending I.R.C. § 402(a)(5)(E)(v) (1982)). This
amendment was made so as to "clariffy] that the distribution of the entire balance to the
credit of an employee in a qualified plan may be treated as a distribution eligible for rol-
lover under the partial distribution rollover rules so long as such distribution does not con-
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For distributions made after 1986, however, this technical cor-
rection will have less of an impact. The 1986 Act allows the roll-
over treatment for partial distributions, with three modifications
only when they are accompanied by one of the 402(e)(4)(A)
events.164 First, it is not sufficient that the employee be over fifty-
nine and a half years of age: he or she must have received the dis-
tribution on account of separation from service or disability. Sec-
ond, "separation from service" will apply as a permissible event
even if the individual is self-employed. Third, the election required
by section 402(e)(4)(B) is pre-empted by the election required by
section 402(e)(4)(A). 165 In addition, a 1986 technical correction
provision clarifies that the formerly allowed "qualified voluntary
contributions" are not to be taken into account for purposes of cal-
culating the balance to the credit of the employee under the partial
distribution rollover rules. 66
Another advantage to taxpayers, is as conclusively stated by
the Service,6 7 that IRA distributions may now commence at any
age as long as they are received as an annuity. Former Code sec-
tion 408(f) provided that if any amount was distributed from an
IRA before age fifty-nine and a half, a penalty tax equal to 10% of
the amount included in gross income would be imposed; the mode
of payment being irrelevant. This provision has now been repealed
by section 1123(d) of the 1986 Act which places IRA's under the
more general provisions of the new Code subsection 72(t).16 1 The
IRS's conclusion was based upon the fact that this new Code pro-
vision exempts from this penalty tax any distributions which are
"part of a series of substantially equal periodic payments (not less
frequently than annually) made for the life (or life expectancy) of
the employee or the joint lives (or joint life expectancies) of such
employee and his beneficiary .... ,"169
stitute a 'qualified total distribution.'" SEN. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1016 (1986).
164 Act, supra note 4, at § 1122(e)(1) amending I.R.C. § 402(a)(5)(D)(i) (1982).
165 Id.
168 Act, supra note 4, at § 1852(b)(2), amending I.R.C. § 402(a)(5)(D) (West Supp.
1987).
,17 See IRS Announcement 87-2, 1987-2 IRB.
168 See I.R.C. § 72(t) (West Supp. 1987). This subsection, entitled "10 Percent addi-
tional tax on early distributions from qualified retirement plans", refers to I.R.C. § 4974(c),
which includes IRA's in the definition of "Qualified Retirement Plans." Id. at § 72(t)(1).
"69 See id. at § 72(t)(2)(A)(iv). Since subsection 72(t)(3)(A), entitled "Certain excep-
tions not to apply to individual retirement plans," does not make reference to
72(t)(2)(A)(iv), this exception is valid for an IRA. See IRS Announcement 87-2, 1987-2 IRB.
Furthermore, this annuity like payment exemption for IRAs is not contingent upon the em-
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The new Act also modifies the TEFRA prohibition against in-
vestment of IRA assets in "collectibles" by allowing investment in
gold and silver coins issued by the United States government.1 0
The technical corrections portion of the Act reiterates that
whether a person is actively working or retired, distributions for
his IRA must begin no later than April first of the year following
the year in which the annuitant reaches age seventy and a half.171
The same section also resolves an important uncertainty by man-
dating that distributions from an IRA are subject to the "inciden-
tal death benefit requirement" to which qualified plans are sub-
ject.17 2 These limitations essentially state that the present value of
the payments to be made to the individual during life must exceed
one-half the present value of the aggregate payments which will be
made to that individual and his death benefit beneficiary. 173
CONCLUSION
Significant changes have occurred in the area of taxation of
life insurance, annuities and IRA's owing to the enactment of the
1982, 1984 and 1986 tax acts. These pieces of legislation have made
a great deal of the old learning obsolete. To understand these new
patterns is to be able to guide clients through the tax consequences
of actions which impinge on such central concerns as financial se-
curity and the duty to care for one's dependents.
As highlighted herein, the change in the treatment of the de-
ductibility of interest on a life insurance policy loan has been any-
thing but gradual. This revolution has culminated in the 1986 Act's
elimination of all "personal interest" deductions. Likewise, a cor-
porate taxpayer's ability to deduct policy loan interest is now sub-
ject to a dollar limitation. Withdrawals from the cash value of a
ployee's separation from service as in the case of the other "qualified retirement plans. See
I.R.C. § 72(t)(3) (1986) (separation of service provision not applicable to IRAs).
170 See Act, supra note 4, at § 1144 (amending I.R.C. § 408(m)(3) (1982). Otherwise the
acquisition of "collectibles" by an IRA is treated as a distribution from such account "in an
amount equal to the cost to such account of such collectible." I.R.C. § 408(m)(1) (West
Supp. 1987).
171 See Act, supra note 4, at § 1852(a)(1)(A), (B) (amending I.R.C. § 408(a)(6), (b)(3)
(1982)).
'72 See id. at § 1852(a)(1)(B) (amending I.R.C. § 408(a)(6) (1982)). See generally Con-
sentino, Minimizing Income Tax on IRA Distributions While Avoiding Estate Tax Still
Possible, ESTATE PLANNING 292, 293-94 (Sept.-Oct. 1986) (when planning post-death IRA
distributions one should consider person or entity to receive such distributions and manner
of said payment).
'71 See Rev. Rul. 72-241, 1972-1 C.B. 108.
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life insurance policy have undergone substantial changes in their
tax treatment, particularly in light of the statutory definition of
life insurance added by the 1984 Act. Most importantly, however,
the statutes preserve the tax-free nature of the inside build-up.
Similarly, distributions received from annuities have encoun-
tered numerous changes. In addition, withdrawals from annuity
contracts no longer receive cost recovery treatment since the 1982
Act and are subject to a penalty tax in certain cases. Forced distri-
bution rules need also be noted with respect to post-death
distributions.
Finally, IRA's, and the tax treatment thereof, have been espe-
cially affected by the 1986 Act. Deductions of contributions made
thereto by taxpayers actively participating in other qualified plans
may now be subject to limits based on adjusted gross income.
Some taxpayers affected by this limitation may nevertheless be
permitted to make non-deductible contributions to their IRA's
without subjecting themselves to an "excess contributions" penalty
tax. Furthermore, clarifications and other changes have been made
by the 1986 Act with respect to the ability to "rollover" distribu-
tions to IRA's.
This article has attempted to fully discuss these and other re-
lated issues in order to facilitate a practitioner's understanding of
a complex and ever-changing area of the law. It is the author's
hope that one's reading hereof will result in more informed advice
for one's clients.
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